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      Abstract— Mobile malware has been growing in scale and 
complexity spurred by the unabated uptake of smartphones 
worldwide. Android is fast becoming the most popular mobile 
platform resulting in sharp increase in malware targeting the 
platform. Additionally, Android malware is evolving rapidly to 
evade detection by traditional signature-based scanning. Despite 
current detection measures in place, timely discovery of new 
malware is still a critical issue. This calls for novel approaches to 
mitigate the growing threat of zero-day Android malware. 
Hence, in this paper we develop and analyze proactive Machine 
Learning approaches based on Bayesian classification aimed at 
uncovering unknown Android malware via static analysis. The 
study, which is based on a large malware sample set of majority 
of the existing families, demonstrates detection capabilities with 
high accuracy. Empirical results and comparative analysis are 
presented offering useful insight towards development of 
effective static-analytic Bayesian classification based solutions 
for detecting unknown Android malware.   
       Keywords- mobile security,  Android,  malware detection,  
data mining, Bayesian classification,  static analysis,  machine 
learning. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The Android mobile platform is increasing in popularity 
surpassing rivals like iOS, Blackberry, Symbian and Windows 
mobile. The apps available on the Google Play Android 
market alone are well over 675,000, with an estimated 25 
billion downloads (as at October 2012) [1]. At the same time, 
malware targeting the Android platform has risen sharply over 
the last two years. According to a report from Fortinet 
(November 2011), approximately 2000 Android malware 
samples belonging to 80 different families had been 
discovered [2]. Since the discovery of the first Android 
malware in August 2010, more sophisticated families capable 
of evading traditional signature-based detection are emerging 
[3].   
In February 2012, Google introduced Bouncer to its 
official app marketplace to screen submitted apps for 
malicious behavior. No doubt a welcome development 
towards curbing malware, this has not completely eliminated 
the problem. Bouncer is based on run-time dynamic 
behavioral analysis; and possible means of circumventing its 
analysis process have been demonstrated by Oberheide and 
Miller [4].  Moreover, other than Google Play, users 
commonly download apps from third party sources not 
protected by Bouncer. 
According to security experts, the difficulties in spotting 
malicious mobile apps results in most Android malware 
remaining unnoticed for up to 3 months before being 
discovered [2]. Furthermore, Oberheide et al. [5] observed that 
it took on average 48 days for a signature-based antivirus 
engine to become capable of detecting new threats. 
Clearly, there is a need for improved detection capabilities 
to overcome the aforementioned challenges and mitigate the 
impact of evolving Android malware. Hence, in this paper we 
present Bayesian classification based machine learning 
approaches that utilize static analysis to enable proactive 
Android malware detection. The methods are effective in 
detecting known families as well as unknown malware with 
reasonably high accuracy. Thus, it is definitely useful in 
overcoming the limitations of traditional signature-based 
scanning as well as viable for filtering apps for further 
analysis by complementary methods or manual reverse 
engineering analysis by security analysts, thus reducing the 
costs and effort involved in uncovering new malware samples. 
In this paper, three Bayesian classification based 
approaches for detecting Android malware are presented and 
analyzed. These are developed from application characteristics 
obtained through automated static analysis using a large scale 
malware sample library of 49 known Android families and a 
wide variety of benign apps. We discuss three viable Bayesian 
classification models that can be built from statically mining a 
large collection of apps, and provide empirical results that 
offer useful insight towards development of effective 
automated static analysis based solutions for detecting 
unknown Android malware.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: related work 
is discussed followed by the automated reverse engineering 
and static analysis that underpins the proposed Bayesian 
approaches. Next, the Bayesian models’ formulation is 
presented. Experiments, results and analyses follow; the paper 
is then concluded further work outlined. 
2. RELATED WORK  
In the current literature, related work on behavioral based 
mobile malware detection such as [7], [8] or on-device 
anomaly detection [9] can be found. Different from the 
aforementioned, this paper proposes and analyzes off-device, 
data mining approaches that employ static analysis of Android 
application packages, whilst avoiding performance bottleneck 
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issues of on-device approaches. Static analysis has the 
advantage of being undetectable, as obviously malware cannot 
modify its behavior during analysis [2]. Thus, it has been 
applied to Android vulnerability assessment, profiling, threat 
detection etc. For example, ComDroid [10] is a static analysis 
tool for detecting application communication vulnerabilities. 
DroidChecker [11] is a tool for detecting capability leakage in 
Android applications. ProfileDroid [12] is a monitoring and 
profiling system for characterizing Android app behaviors at 
multiple layers: static, user, OS and network. RiskRanker [6] 
provides not only profiling but also automated risk assessment 
to police Android markets and aid zero-day malware 
detection. RiskRanker employs a two-order risk analysis 
system and classifies apps as high, medium or low risk. 
Profiling and reporting function for Android applications 
based on static analysis is also presented in [13]. Though the 
method used in [13] is designed to identify security and 
privacy threats, unlike the study in this paper, it is not based 
on data mining or machine learning.  
Other existing works that employ static analysis for 
detection of malicious activities like SCANDAL [14], 
AndroidLeaks [15], and the framework presented in [16], 
focus on privacy information leakage. Whereas, the malicious 
activities targeted by our work extends beyond privacy 
information loss.   
In [17] Blasing et al. presented an Android Application 
Sandbox (AAS) that uses both static and dynamic analyses on 
Android applications to automatically detect suspicious 
applications. For the static analysis part, the code is 
decompiled and 5 different types of patterns are matched 
namely: JNI usage, reflection, spawning child processes, 
services and IPC usage, and runtime requested permissions. 
Compared to AAS, our methods cover a much wider range of 
pattern attributes extracted not only from the application code 
logic but also scrutiny of resources, assets, and executable 
libraries where malicious payload could be lurking. 
Additionally, these attributes contribute to ranked feature sets 
which drive our Bayesian classification models. 
In [2] Apvrille and Strazzere employ a heuristics approach 
based on static analysis for Android malware detection. Their 
heuristic engine uses 39 different flags weighted based on 
statistics computed from techniques commonly employed by 
malware authors in their code. The engine then outputs a risk 
score to highlight the most likely malicious sample. Our 
approach shares similarity in the reverse engineering 
technique, but differs by utilizing Bayesian classification 
methods that are more flexible and easier to maintain. For 
example, models can be re-trained as new malware samples 
are discovered, while features sets can be automatically 
updated.  
In [18], Schmidt et al. employ static analysis on 
executables to extract their function calls using the readelf 
command. They then compare these function call lists with 
those from Linux malware executables in order to classify the 
executables using learning algorithms. In contrast, our static 
analysis approach is based on automated analyses of Android 
packages. Moreover, Android malware samples across a wide 
range of existing families are employed in our work rather 
than Linux malware executables.  
Other earlier non-Android based papers have explored data 
mining and machine learning techniques for malware 
identification including for example [19], [20] and [28]. The 
authors of [19] apply machine learning methods on a data set 
of malicious executables where a set of Windows and MS-
DOS format executables are utilized while comparing three 
learning algorithms with signature based detection. While [20] 
is based on application of data mining methods and SVM to 
distinguish between benign executables and virus by statically 
extracting dynamic link libraries and application programming 
interfaces.  
For the Android platform, a paper by Sahs and Khan [21] 
presented a machine learning approach for Android malware 
detection based on SVM. A single-class SVM model derived 
from benign samples alone is used. Contrary to their approach, 
our classification models are trained with both a wide variety 
of benign apps and a range of samples from across 49 
malware families discovered in the wild.  Also, in [22], 
PUMA (Permission usage to detect malware in Android) 
detects malicious Android applications through machine-
learning techniques by analyzing the extracted permissions 
from the application itself. Our work leverages not only 
permissions, but also other code-based properties through 
automated reverse engineering to investigate our data-mining 
approach for malware detection. Moreover, our study was 
undertaken with a larger malware sample set. Different from 
[22], this paper also provides insight into permissions usage 
from a different perspective; i.e. in-depth comparative analysis 
with the use of other viable application properties to underpin 
the machine learning detection approach. 
In summary, the main contributions of this paper different 
from existing related works in the literature are as follows: 
• Novel approaches that apply automated static 
analysis based Bayesian classification for proactive Android 
malware detection.  
• Extensive empirical evaluation and comparative 
analysis of the Bayesian classification methods with a large 
malware sample set from across 49 malware families in the 
wild. 
Our approach for discovery of unknown malicious 
applications is motivated by the need to bolster existing 
methods given their limitations. We also note that the 
significant delay between malware release and eventual 
discovery is still a critical. 
3. ANDROID APP REVERSE ENGINEERING  
Android applications are written in Java and compiled by 
the Android SDK tools —along with any data and resource 
files—into an Android package (APK), an archive file with an 
.apk suffix. All the code in a single .apk file is considered to 
be one application and it is this file that Android-powered 
devices use to install the application. The applications are 
distributed as self-contained packages that are compressed 
(ZIP) bundle of files typically consisting of: 
AndroidManifest.xml (Manifest file), classes.dex (A single 
file which holds the complete bytecode to be interpreted by 
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Dalvik VM). Other binary or XML-based resources required 
by the application to run may be held in res/ and assets/ 
folders. 
Decompress .apk 
files into folders
Convert Manifest.xml 
binary  to readable 
manifest.xml.clean
Disassemble each 
classe.dex file to 
constituent .smali
Mine .smali files to 
extract code-based 
features
Permissions-based 
feature vectors 
Mine manifest.xml.clean 
files  to extract Permissions
Code-based 
feature vectors 
Mixed Permissions 
and Code-based 
feature vectors 
 
 
Figure 1. Automated Android app reverse engineering and 
data mining for Bayesian model(s) feature extraction with 
the Java-based custom built APK analyzer.  
 
The Android application is built from four different types 
of components: Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers, and 
Content Providers [23]. An application must declare its 
components in a Manifest file which must be at the root of the 
application project directory. Before the Android system can 
start an application component, the system must know that the 
component exists by reading this file. The Manifest file also 
states the user permissions that the application requires, such 
as internet access or read-access to the user’s contacts.   
In order to facilitate the machine learning detection 
approaches in this paper, we implemented a Java-based 
Android package analyzer and profiling tool for automated 
reverse engineering of the APK files. The steps involved are 
shown in Figure 1. 
First, the .apk files are decompressed into separate folders 
containing the Manifest file, .dex file and other resource 
subfolders. Afterwards, the manifest file is converted into 
readable format using AXML2jar. The .dex file is then 
disassembled using a tool called Baksmali [24]. Baksmali is a 
disassembler for the dex format used by Dalvik. Baksmali 
disassembles .dex files into multiple files with .smali 
extensions. Each .smali file contains only one class 
information which is equivalent to a Java .class file. The files 
in the decompressed folders are mined to extract relevant 
properties subsequently used to construct the Bayesian 
classification-based models. 
 
4. THE MACHINE LEARNING APPROACHES 
Data mining and machine learning are increasingly being 
applied in the anti-malware industry, particularly in 
augmenting well-established heuristics and generics methods 
[25]. Data mining drives automation, which is motivated by 
reducing maintenance costs associated with the traditional 
heuristics and generics methods [25].  Data mining usually 
employs machine learning methods for inference, prediction, 
classification etc. Hence, it is important to select an 
appropriate method depending on the particular application. 
Bayesian classification is well suited to our problem of 
filtering large amounts of apps as it can perform relatively fast 
classification with low computational overhead once trained. 
Another important property which motivates its 
implementation in our approach for detecting suspicious 
Android applications, is the ability to model both an ‘expert’ 
and  ‘learning’ system with relative ease compared to other 
machine learning techniques. Bayesian method allows the 
incorporation of prior probabilities (expert knowledge) even 
before the training phase. This hybrid property can be 
exploited as a performance tuning tool without incurring 
additional computational overhead. 
4.1 The classifier model 
The Bayesian based classifier consists of learning and 
detection stages. The learning stage uses a training set of 
known malicious samples in the wild and another set of 
benign Android applications, collectively called the app 
corpus. The Java-based package analyzer uses several 
‘detectors’ to extract the desired features from each app in the 
corpus. The feature set is subsequently reduced by a feature 
ranking and selection function, while the training function 
calculates the marginal and conditional probabilities used in 
formulating the algorithm employed for the final classification 
decisions.  
4.2 Feature ranking and selection 
Let an application characteristic ri obtained from mining of 
the APKs by the analyzer, be defined by a random variable:  
1, cov det
0,{i
if dis ered by the ectors
otherwiseR                                   (1) 
In order to ensure selection of the most relevant 
application features for the classification stage, we calculate 
the Mutual Information (MI) [26] or information gain of each 
feature Ri with respect to the class variable C.  This is used to 
rank the features and select the most relevant features during 
the feature selection stage prior to model training. Let C be a 
random variable representing the application class, suspicious 
or benign: 
,{ }C suspicious benign
 
Every application is assigned a vector defined by 
 1, 2,... nr r r r
with ri being the result of the ith random 
variable Ri. As the goal is to select the most relevant features, 
the feature selection function computes the MI ranking score 
of each random variable calculated as follows: 
 
 
    
2
;
; og
.
0,1 { , }
( , ) P Ri r C cP Ri r C c l
P Ri r P C c
r c sus ben
MI Ri C           
  
   (2) 
Author’s personal copy 
 
Given that  
; ( ) ( | )P Ri r C c P Ri r P C c Ri r      
 the above equation 
becomes: 
   
 
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|
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 
  
        
  
 (3) 
After calculating the score for each feature Ri, the feature 
set is then ranked in descending order and the top n most 
relevant features with the highest information gain are then 
selected for training the model in order to maximize the 
classification accuracy.  
4.3 Bayesian classification. 
A.  Model evaluation 
According to Bayes theorem, the probability of an 
application with the feature vector 
 1, 2,... nr r r r
 
belonging in class C is given by:  
1
{0,1} 1
( | )
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j i
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
 
  (4) 
Where ( | )i iP R r C c   and ( )jP C c are the estimated 
probabilities obtained from the frequencies calculated on the 
app learning corpus.  While n is the number of features used in 
the classification engine; c0 and c1 are the benign and 
suspicious classes respectively. 
An app represented by the vector 
 1, 2,... nr r r r
 is 
classified as benign if:            
( | ) ( | )P C benign R r P C suspicious R r         (5) 
Otherwise, it is classified as suspicious. In terms of 
classification error, two cases can occur: (a) A benign app 
misclassified as suspicious. (b) A suspicious app misclassified 
as benign. In the context of our problem, the latter case is 
considered more critical, since allowing a malicious app to 
reach an end device is more critical than excluding a benign 
app from the distribution chain to be subject to further 
scrutiny. 
4.4 Implemented Bayesian models from different data 
mining approaches 
Three different data mining methods are implemented 
within the apk analyzer in order to build the Bayesian 
classification models. Through automated mining of the pre-
processed .apk files, three separate models are built from:  
 Input features derived from standard Android 
permissions extracted by static analysis of the 
Manifest files.  
 Input features derived from code-based properties 
obtained by parsing disassembled .dex files present 
in the apk and other external resource files resulting 
from the apk decompression by the custom built 
analyzer.  
 Input feature set consisting of a mixture of both 
standard permissions and code-based properties. 
 
4.4.1 Permission-based Bayesian classifier 
Permissions are the most recognizable security feature in 
Android [22].  A user must accept them in order to install an 
application. Kirin [27] uses permissions for lightweight on-
device application certification. Permissions have also been 
used in several of the Android tools mentioned in section 2, 
to provide app profiling information. Thus, their efficacy for 
machine learning based malware detection using trained 
models from large malware sample sets will be investigated. 
A permission is declared using the <uses-permission> 
tag in the Manifest file. For example, in order for an 
application to read phone contacts it must declare the 
standard Android permission as follows: 
<uses-permission 
android:name="android.permission.READ_CON
TACTS"> 
</uses-permission> 
In order to build our permission-based model, 2000 
Android applications comprising 1000 malware samples 
(from 49 different families) and 1000 benign apps were 
utilized. The apk analyzer parses the decrypted manifest file 
from each app and uses a permissions detector to match 131 
standard Android permissions. Once a permission is detected, 
its count is incremented and stored. The stored total for each 
permission is further utilized by the feature selection function 
to rank and select the most relevant features for the 
permission-based Bayesian classifier, using equation (3).  
The breakdown of the 49 malware families used and their 
respective number of samples are shown in Table 1. The 
malware samples were obtained from the Android Malware 
Genome Project [3]. The set of 1000 non-malicious apps 
were made up of different categories in order to cover a wide 
variety of application types. The categories include: 
entertainment, system tools, sports, health and fitness, news 
and magazines, finance, music and audio, business, 
education, games and a few other miscellaneous categories. 
The apps from third party market places were screened using 
virustotal scanning service to exclude potentially malicious 
apps from the benign set. 
TABLE 1.  MALWARE FAMILIES USED AND THEIR NUMBERS. 
FAMILY 
NO  OF 
SAMPLES 
FAMILY 
NO OF 
SAMPLES 
ADRD 22 GINGERMASTER 4 
ANSERVERBOT 130 GOLDDREAM 47 
ASROOT 8 GONE60 9 
BASEBRIDGE 100 GPSSMSSPY 6 
BEANBOT 8 HIPPOSMS 4 
BGSERVE 9 JIFAKE 1 
COINPIRATE 1 JSMSHIDER 16 
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CRUSEWIN 2 KMIN 52 
DOGWARS 1 LOVETRAP 1 
DROIDCOUPON 1 NICKYBOT 1 
DROIDDELUXE 1 NICKYSPY 2 
DROIDDREAM 16 PJAPPS 58 
DROIDDREAMLIGHT 46 PLANKTON 11 
DROIDKUNGFU1 30 ROUGELEMON 2 
DROIDKUNGFU2 34 ROUGESPPUSH 9 
DROIDKUNGFU3 144 SMSREPLICATOR 1 
DROIDKUNGFU4 80 SNDAPPS 10 
DROIDKUNGFUSAPP 3 SPITMO 1 
DROIDKUNGFUUPDATE 1 TAPSNAKE 2 
ENDOFDAY 1 WALKINWAT 1 
FAKENETFLIX 1 YZHC 22 
FAKEPLAYER 6 ZHASH 11 
GAMBLERSMS 1 ZITMO 1 
GEINIMI 69 ZSONE 12 
GGTRACKER 1 
  
 
The top 20 requested permissions extracted from the 
malware sample set are given in the Table 2. The top 20 
permissions from the benign sample set are also shown in 
Table 3. Note that the top 20 permissions for malware samples 
were exactly as obtained in [3], whose Android Malware 
Genome project was the source of the malware samples used 
to build and analyze the models in our work1.  
With the exception of ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE, 
INTERNET, WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE and 
READ_PHONE_STATE, the top 10 requested standard 
permissions in our malware samples and benign set were 
different. It is interesting to note that READ_SMS, 
SEND_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS and WRITE SMS were 
amongst the 10 most requested in the malware samples but did 
not occur in the top 20 for our benign samples. (These were 
not in the top 20 of 1260 top free benign apps studied in [3] 
either, with the exception of SEND_SMS which was the 17th 
on the top 20 list in [3].) 
 
Table 2. Top 20 requested permissions from 1000 malware 
samples. The ranking corresponds to the findings in [3]1. 
Permissions Frequency 
INTERNET 939 
READ_PHONE_STATE 888 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 741 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 651 
READ_SMS 591 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 546 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 497 
WRITE_SMS 466 
SEND_SMS 443 
RECEIVE_SMS 394 
VIBRATE 357 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 355 
READ_CONTACTS 344 
CALL_PHONE 324 
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 320 
WAKE_LOCK 294 
WRITE_CONTACTS 263 
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE 251 
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS 249 
RESTART_PACKAGES 231 
 
Table 3. Top 20 requested permissions from 1000 benign 
samples.  
Permissions  Frequency 
INTERNET 856 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE 651 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 471 
READ_PHONE_STATE 388 
VIBRATE 261 
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION 245 
WAKE_LOCK 234 
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION 221 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 180 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 176 
READ_CONTACTS 102 
WRITE_SETTINGS 93 
GET_ACCOUNTS 88 
CAMERA 85 
CALL_PHONE 75 
WRITE_CONTACTS 54 
GET_TASKS 51 
RECORD_AUDIO 51 
READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS 41 
WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS 35 
 
This indicated that permissions attributes would provide 
discriminative capabilities for training the classifier to 
distinguish between malware and benign applications. In order 
to evaluate the permissions-based model, we carried out 
experiments designed to determine: (a) How effective the 
permissions-based features extracted from analysis of our 
malware and benign sample sets are in detecting unknown 
malware. (b) How well the permission-based model performs 
compared to the other viable models e.g. trained models 
derived from code properties extracted as features. Section 6 
presents experimental results that provide some interesting 
insights.  
1 The top 20 permissions obtained from our benign set was also similar to the findings in [3], even though a different benign sample set of 
1000 was used in this paper. 
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These are indeed pertinent questions given that a larger 
malware sample set covering more recent strains of Android 
malware is employed for our investigations compared to most 
previous works in Android malware detection that utilize 
machine learning. Also, permission based models provide a 
relatively lightweight static analysis approach since the need 
for reverse engineering of the .dex files and parsing a large 
number of files for feature extraction and classification is 
eliminated, resulting in considerable reduction of detection 
effort and time. Furthermore, permissions-based classification 
is useful because it is not susceptible to disassembly or 
decompilation failure which can sometimes hamper the 
reverse engineering during static analysis. 
There are around 131 standard Android permissions that 
govern access to different system and device hardware 
resources. A user that intends to install an app will be 
prompted to accept or reject all the permissions requested by 
the app.  In our model, we applied the analysis data for all of 
the 131 standard Android permissions to the feature selection 
function. The top ranked permissions (according to equation 
(3)) were subsequently selected for training the permissions-
based Bayesian classifier. The top 30 ranked permissions and 
their respective information gain scores are shown in the Table 
4.  
 
Table 4. Top 30 ranked permissions for the permission-
based model (according to equation 3). 
Ranked Permissions Benign Malware 
 
Total 
Infogain 
score 
READ_SMS 20 591 611 0.32920 
WRITE_SMS 11 466 477 0.25053 
READ_PHONE_STATE 388 888 1276 0.20962 
SEND_SMS 24 443 467 0.20709 
RECEIVE_SMS 14 394 408 0.19305 
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS 4 249 253 0.12410 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 176 546 722 0.11094 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED 180 497 677 0.08335 
INSTALL_PACKAGES 10 199 209 0.08274 
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE 31 251 282 0.08073 
CALL_PHONE 75 324 399 0.07443 
RESTART_PACKAGES 29 231 260 0.07289 
READ_CONTACTS 102 344 446 0.06366 
WRITE_CONTACTS 54 263 317 0.06351 
DISABLE_KEYGUARD 21 155 176 0.04514 
READ_LOGS 18 145 163 0.04382 
SET_WALLPAPER 27 145 172 0.03482 
MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS 14 115 129 0.03451 
READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS 41 169 210 0.03351 
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH 1 60 61 0.02747 
WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS 35 137 172 0.02537 
RECEIVE_MMS 3 63 66 0.02487 
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 471 651 1122 0.02386 
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE 19 99 118 0.02266 
GET_TASKS 51 154 205 0.02168 
DELETE_PACKAGES 7 61 68 0.01828 
CAMERA 85 18 103 0.01793 
PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS 10 66 76 0.01724 
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS 
 
33 
 
103 
 
136 
 
0.01459 
INTERNET 856 939 1795 0.01386 
 
The impact of the ranking-based feature selection on near 
similar shared occurrences in permissions like 
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE, ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, 
WAKE_LOCK, ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, and VIBRATE 
can be clearly observed by their absence in Table 4, despite 
being in the top 20 permissions seen in both categories. It can 
also be observed with INTERNET permission being the 30th 
ranked feature. 
The top ranked n permissions were used to construct the 
input feature vectors  1, 2,... nr r r r  that characterize each 
application used in the training corpus. As mentioned earlier, 
ri is binary {0,1} indicating the presence or otherwise of the ith 
ranked permission in the feature vector. 
 
4.4.2 Code-based properties Bayesian classifier 
Unlike the permission-based model described above, the 
code-based model utilizes features extracted from code-based 
properties. A number of code-based properties were specified 
as matching criteria for a set of property detectors 
implemented within the apk analyzer. The detectors parse 
.smali files obtained from disassembled .dex files. In addition, 
external libraries, files within assets folders and resources 
folders are also scrutinized, if present within a decompressed 
APK. 
The code-based properties matched by the detectors 
include: Android and Java API calls, Linux system 
commands, and some Android based commands and 
notifications. These provided a large feature set which were 
subsequently reduced to the top n most relevant ones using the 
information gain criterion defined in equation 3. In total, we 
utilized 58 code-based properties for feature extraction. Our 
selection of these properties were guided by previous work 
(especially those that utilized similar properties for profiling 
Android apps and risk analysis) [2], [6], [16], as well as 
malware reports issued by mobile anti-virus vendors such as 
McAfee, and Lookout, detailing characteristics of  malware 
discovered in the wild through manual analysis [32], [33]. 
Some of the described characteristics of several known 
malware families enabled us to define several corresponding 
matching properties for the property detectors that we 
employed for feature extraction. For example, concealment of 
secondary files in the resources or assets folders by 
sophisticated malware such as Basebridge, Asroot (which 
conceal shell scripts/commands to be executed at runtime), is 
the basis for defining features based on system commands 
such as ‘chmod’, ‘mount’ , ‘remount’ ‘chown’, etc. The 
capabilities for dynamic code loading exhibited by families 
like Plankton also informed the choice of ‘DexClassLoader’ 
API calls and the inclusion of detecting embedded secondary 
‘.jar’ and ‘.apk’ files as properties; while the use of encryption 
in malware such as AnserverBot, Beanbot etc., influenced the 
inclusion of cryptography API calls as property features.  
In addition to attributes defined from domain knowledge 
gathered from the aforementioned sources, we included 
properties defined from observing outline profiles of hundreds 
of apps generated from our Java based APK analyzer and our 
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lab-based study of publicly available malware samples from 
[30] and [31]. These profiles uncovered a high frequency of 
occurrences of some obvious properties (API calls) that 
indicated telephony services usage, Internet access, SMS 
activities, access to user contacts, messages and call logs etc., 
which facilitate theft of sensitive information and premium 
rate services access (both  incentives for malware authors). 
Other additional properties we included in the feature set 
relate to the package manager API, presence of native code, 
the use of reflection-related API functions, and functions 
related to running background child processes.  
 In order to build the code-property based model, we 
applied the 58 properties to the same 2000 apps used for the 
permissions-based model. 10 out of these properties did not 
yield any match in the benign or malicious sample set, so were 
discarded. The remaining 48 were subsequently applied to the 
feature selection function which ranked them according to 
their scores. The top 25 ranked code-based properties and their 
respective frequencies in benign and malware categories are 
shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. Top 25 selected code-based properties and their 
frequencies in the benign and malware sets containing 
1000 samples  each (ranked using equation 3).  
 
Properties Benign malware 
 
Total 
Infogain 
score 
getSubscriberId 
(TelephonyManager) 42 742 784 0.42853 
getDeviceId       
(TelephonyManager) 316 854 1170 0.22919 
getSimSerialNumber   
(TelephonyManager) 35 455 490 0.19674 
.apk      (secondary payload) 89 537 626 0.18202 
chmod    (system command) 19 389 408 0.17989 
abortBroadcast   (intercepting 
broadcast notifications) 4 328 332 0.17323 
intent.action.BOOT 
_COMPLETED 69 482 551 0.16862 
Runtime.exec( )    (Executing 
process) 62 458 520 0.16163 
/system/app 4 292 296 0.15036 
getLine1Number    
(TelephonyManager) 111 491 602 0.13116 
/system/bin 45 368 413 0.12779 
createSubprocess   (creating 
child process) 0 169 169 0.08615 
remount            (system 
command ) 3 122 125 0.05502 
DexClassLoader   (stealthily 
loading a class) 16 152 168 0.04953 
getSimOperator   
(TelephonyManager) 37 196 233 0.04811 
pm install         (installing 
additional packages) 0 98 98 0.04725 
chown           (system 
command) 5 107 112 0.04325 
getCallState     
(TelephonyManager) 10 119 129 0.04142 
/system/bin/sh 4 90 94 0.03647 
.jar           (secondary payload) 87 252 339 0.03616 
mount         (system command) 29 152 181 0.03605 
KeySpec           (code 
encryption) 99 254 353 0.03067 
SMSReceiver 3 66 69 0.02634 
getNetworkOperator   
(TelephonyManager) 202 353 555 0.02071 
SecretKey (code encryption) 119 248 367 0.02039 
 
The table shows that some of the code-based properties 
such as ‘pm install’ and ‘createSubprocess’ were only found 
to be present in the malware sample set. References to system 
commands were also found mainly in the malware samples. 
References to .apk and .jar files which the detectors use to 
discover possible presence of secondary apps are found in 
both categories, but with more occurrences in the malware 
samples. Whilst secondary apps can be used to hide malicious 
payload, some legitimate apps such as popular ad and mobile 
payment frameworks are also know to utilize them [2]. As 
with the permissions-based model, the top ranked n code-
based properties were used to construct the input feature 
vectors  1, 2,... nr r r r  that characterize each application 
used in the training corpus, after the feature selection stage. 
 
4.4.3 Classifier based on combined ranked permissions 
and code-based properties 
 
The third data mining approach that was implemented in 
the analyzer utilized a combination of permissions and code 
properties. The feature selection function was used to 
simultaneously rank the permissions and properties obtained 
from the code, using our 1000 benign and 1000 malware 
samples. The highest ranked from both were subsequently 
selected as input feature vectors for the Bayesian classifier 
model. The top 25 ranked from both permissions and code 
property-based feature selections are shown in Table 6. The 
top ten ranked had 5 permission-based and 5 code property-
based properties. As can be seen from Table 6, the code 
properties were generally ranked higher within the top 25 than 
the permissions. This was because overall, more of the code 
property-based attributes had clearer discrepancies in their 
frequency in both categories than the permission based 
attributes. For this reason, code properties were likely to 
generate higher ranking scores than permissions. 
 
Table 6. Top 25 selected mixed features and their 
frequencies (ranked using equation 3). 
 
Mixed Permission 
 and code properties Benign malware 
 
Total 
Infogain 
score 
getSubscriberId  
(TelephonyManager) 42 742 784 0.42853 
READ_SMS 20 591 611 0.32920 
WRITE_SMS 11 466 477 0.25053 
getDeviceId        
(TelephonyManager) 316 854 1170 0.22919 
READ_PHONE_STATE 388 888 1276 0.20962 
SEND_SMS 24 443 467 0.20709 
getSimSerialNumber   
 (TelephonyManager) 35 455 490 0.19674 
RECEIVE_SMS 14 394 408 0.19305 
.apk       89 537 626 0.18202 
chmod            19 389 408 0.17989 
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abortBroadcast    4 328 332 0.17323 
intent.action.BOOT 
_COMPLETED 69 482 551 0.16862 
Runtime.exec( )       62 458 520 0.16163 
/system/app 4 292 296 0.15036 
getLine1Number     
(TelephonyManager) 111 491 602 0.13116 
/system/bin 45 368 413 0.12779 
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS 4 249 253 0.12410 
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE 176 546 722 0.11094 
createSubprocess     0 169 169 0.08615 
RECEIVE_BOOT 
_COMPLETED 
180 497 
677 0.08335 
INSTALL_PACKAGES 10 199 209 0.08274 
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE 31 251 282 0.08073 
CALL_PHONE 75 324 399 0.07443 
RESTART_PACKAGES 29 231 260 0.07289 
READ_CONTACTS 102 344 446 0.06366 
 
4.5 Feature extraction times comparison 
The ranking and selection of top relevant features for 
training the models will significantly reduce computational 
overhead during the classification of applications, since the 
lower ranked ‘redundant features’ will not be utilized. This 
can be deduced from the time taken by our APK analyzer to 
extract the properties and construct feature vectors for training 
each of the models. In table 7, the average times taken to 
extract features from 516 reverse engineered apps using 
different feature settings are illustrated. The tests were 
performed on an Ubuntu 10.04 Linux PC running on 2.26 
GHz Intel Xeon processor with 6GB of memory. When using 
top 25 mixed properties alone, the feature vectors were 
extracted from the 516 apps in 319 seconds (5 min 19s). In 
contrast, it took 1392 seconds (23 min 12s) for the analyzer to 
extract feature vectors consisting of all 58 code-based 
properties plus all the 131 permissions. Extracting the feature 
vectors for code-based properties alone took 1339 seconds (22 
min 19s), while the vectors for the 131 permission based 
properties alone took 64 seconds to extract. Hence, at least 
77% reduction in computational time can be achieved by 
feature reduction through the ranking and selection to reduce 
the entire feature space to the top 25 mixed features alone.  
The comparatively lower time taken to extract 131 
permissions feature vectors for the 516 apps illustrates the 
characteristic of permissions based learning and classification 
as a relatively lightweight approach. 
Table 7. Feature vector extraction times from 516 apps 
for various attributes settings. 
Attributes settings 
Feature extraction 
time (s) 
25 top mixed attributes 319 
131 permissions only 64 
58 code properties only 1339 
All 131 permissions and 58 code 
properties 
1392 
 
5. METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTS 
As discussed earlier, our implementation of an APK 
analyzer includes the steps illustrated in Figure 1. The three 
models subsequently built were trained and tested under 
different feature selection settings in order to gain insight into 
their respective performances.    
5.1 Bayesian Classifier training 
For the training of the three Bayesian classification 
models, the same set of 2000 samples comprising 1000 
malware and 1000 benign apps were used. In order to provide 
for testing and evaluation according to the evaluation criteria 
in equations (6) to (12) defined in the next sub-section, 5-fold 
cross validation was employed. Thus, 1600 samples (800 each 
of benign and malware) were used in the training, while the 
remaining 400 (200 each of benign and malware) were used 
for testing. Hence, the experiments undertaken used 5 
different training and testing sets each containing a different 
testing portion with samples outside of its own training 
portion. This strategy was chosen to provide a wider range of 
samples for the testing of the classifiers’ ability to detect 
unknown malware.  
5.2 Evaluation measures 
Several measures have been proposed in the literature for 
evaluating the predictive accuracy of machine learning based 
classifiers. These efficiency measures have been utilized in 
previous machine learning work [22], [28], [29], for example. 
In the context of our problem, the relevant measures utilized in 
our experiments are given below. 
Let ben benn  be the number of benign applications 
correctly classified as benign,  ben susn   the number of 
misclassified benign applications, sus susn   the number of 
suspicious applications correctly identified as suspicious while 
sus benn   represents the number of misclassified suspicious 
applications. Accuracy and Error Rate are respectively given 
by: 
ben ben sus sus
ben ben ben sus sus ben sus sus
Acc
n n
n n n n
 
   


  
              (6)   
ben sus sus ben
ben ben ben sus sus ben sus sus
Err
n n
n n n n
 
   


  
              (7)   
The accuracy measurement indicates the overall proportion 
of correctly classified instances, whether suspicious or benign, 
during the testing phase of the particular model. The error rate 
given by (7) is the complementary measure to the accuracy, 
which can also be computed from Err =1-Acc. We also define 
the false positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR), true 
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positive rate (TPR), true negative rate (TNR) and precision (р) 
as follows: 
ben sus
ben sus ben ben
FPR
n
n n

 


                                              (8) 
sus ben
sus sus sus ben
FNR
n
n n

 


                                               (9) 
sus sus
sus ben sus sus
TPR
n
n n

 


                                               (10) 
ben ben
ben sus ben ben
TNR
n
n n

 


                                             (11) 
sus sus
ben sus sus sus
p
n
n n

 


                                                  (12) 
The false positive rate FPR, with respect to the suspicious 
class is measured by the proportion of misclassified true 
benign samples to the total number of benign sample instances 
during the testing phase. This is complementary to the true 
negative rate TNR, given by the proportion of the overall 
benign set that is correctly classified, illustrated by (11).  
Thus, true positive rate, TPR refers to truly malicious samples 
classified as suspicious divided by the overall number of 
malicious samples in the testing set. We also use the TPR and 
‘detection rate’ interchangeably, since this measure represents 
the model’s capability to detect ‘unknown’ malicious samples. 
FNR measures the models tendency to misclassify suspicious 
apps as benign and is complementary to the detection rate. 
The precision reflects the precision of the model when it 
makes a decision to classify a sample as suspicious. Lastly, in 
our experiments, we also measured the AUC (Area under the 
Receiver Operator Characteristics (ROC) curve), i.e. the total 
area under the plot of TPR vs. FPR for every possible 
detection cut-off known as ROC. A perfect classifier will have 
an AUC of 1. Thus, the closer the AUC is to 1, the greater the 
model’s predictive power.  
6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Figures 2 to 7 depict the results of experiments undertaken 
to evaluate the three implemented data mining approaches 
with Bayesian classifiers. The chart legends are suffixed with 
P, C and M to denote results from Permission-based, Code 
property-based and Mixed attributes respectively. Five 
different feature selection settings were used containing 5, 10, 
15 and 20 features. Thus, 10f, 15f and 20f, represent the top 
10, 15 and 20 ranked features according to the information 
gain from equation (3). 5fT refers to the 5 top features while 
5fL refers to five lowest ranked from the top 20 (i.e. 16th to 
20th ranked). 
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Figure 2: Average ACC for the three Bayesian models 
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Figure 3: Average ERR for the three Bayesian models 
From Figure 2, the results show that average accuracy 
improves with number of features selected for the C- and M-
based models, while that of the P-based model peaks at 10 
features. Correspondingly, Figure 3 depicts the average error 
rate decreasing for C- and M-based models as the features 
were increased, while P-based model recorded lowest error 
rate at 10 features. Overall, the best accuracy and error 
performance occurred when 15 features were used with the M-
based Bayesian classifier. These are given in Table 9 as 0.931 
and 0.069 respectively. 
There was a large difference between the 5fL and 5fT 
results for P- and C based classifiers as seen in Figures 2 and 
3. This highlights the effective selectivity of the feature 
selection function, since the same number of features but of 
different rankings were present in 5fL and 5fT feature sets. 
The 5fL features of the M-based model generally have a 
higher ranking than the 5fL features of both P- and C-based 
models; hence, its significantly better performance compared 
to the other two at the 5fL setting. As shown in table 8, the 
combined MI score for the 5fL features in the P-based model 
is 0.17413, while the 5fL features of the C-based model have a 
combined MI score of 0.2165. For the M-based model, the 
combined MI score of the 5fL features is 0.53172. This also 
accounts for the 5fL accuracy and error being relatively closer 
Author’s personal copy 
 
to that of 5fT for the M-based model when compared to the 
case with the P- and C-based models. 
Table 8. Information gain score comparison for the 5fL 
models. 
Model 
P-based 
5fL 
C-based 
5fL 
M-based 
5fL 
Combined Information 
gain score 
0.17413 0.21650 0.53172 
  
Figures 2 and 3 also show that 15f accuracy/error 
performance is better than that of 20f for the M-based model. 
The plausible explanation for this can be found in Table 6. We 
notice that ACCESS_WIFI_STATE, 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, which form part of the 20f 
feature set, have a good number of occurrences in the benign 
category. The absence of these in the 15f set has the overall 
effect of reducing classification error rate. (This also accounts 
for the better TNR and FPR results of 15f than 20f for the M-
based in Figures 6 and 7)  
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Figure 4: Average TPR for the three models. 
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Figure 5: Average FNR for the three models. 
Figure 4 depicts the TPR results for the three models with 
different feature settings. That is, the average rate of unknown 
malware detection by the trained models. The P-based model 
has lower detection rate than the M- and C- models at all 
feature settings, except at 5fL setting where C-based model is 
the lowest. The detection rates are quite similar for the 15f and 
20f sets in C-based and M-based models. The actual values 
are shown in Table 9. 
Overall, the best detection rate and hence lowest false 
negative rate were recorded with 15f used in the M-based 
model. In the context of our problem of filtering large app 
sample collections, a low false negative rate is highly 
desirable since this represents the proportion of ‘missed’ 
malware apps which may subsequently be installed as 
‘benign’ apps. On that basis, the models based on M- or C-
based features with the higher features settings should be 
preferred over the P-based model.   
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Figure 6: Average TNR for the three models. 
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Figure 7: Average FPR for the three models. 
 
In Figure 6, the average TNR results are illustrated. The 
exceptionally good performance shown by the 5fT for the P-
based model can be attributed to ‘sparse feature vectors’ (as a 
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result of fewer features used in model training) that will occur 
in a high proportion of benign samples (and also many of the 
malware samples). This leads to classifier bias towards benign 
class and hence high TNR; but, on the other hand it also 
results in higher FNR as can be seen clearly in Figure 5. Thus, 
we can conclude on that basis that M- or C-based models will 
still be preferable. Moreover, 5fT P-based model only yields 
about 70% detection rate. 
Similarly, the exceptionally high FPR with 5fT for C-
based model as seen in Figure 7 can be attributed to classifier 
bias due to ‘sparse feature vectors’ resulting from low number 
of features used for the model training. Again, from Table 9, 
15f used with M-based model (which has the overall best 
accuracy/error performance) gave a reasonable low FPR of 
0.051. 
Table 9. Summary of experimental results for the three 
models. 
  ERR-P ERR-C ERR-M ACC-P ACC-C ACC-M 
5fL 0.330 0.350 0.175 0.670 0.650 0.826 
5fT 0.142 0.155 0.124 0.859 0.845 0.876 
10f 0.101 0.082 0.103 0.899 0.918 0.897 
15f 0.112 0.079 0.069 0.889 0.921 0.931 
20f 0.147 0.079 0.079 0.853 0.921 0.921 
  
   
  
 
  
  TPR-P TPR-C TPR-M FNR-P FNR-C FNR-M 
5fL 0.429 0.335 0.744 0.571 0.665 0.256 
5fT 0.701 0.799 0.803 0.299 0.201 0.197 
10f 0.844 0.906 0.851 0.156 0.094 0.149 
15f 0.843 0.904 0.909 0.157 0.096 0.091 
20f 0.774 0.906 0.895 0.226 0.094 0.105 
              
  TNR-P TNR-C TNR-M FPR-P FPR-C FPR-M 
5fL 0.911 0.954 0.947 0.089 0.046 0.053 
5fT 0.968 0.890 0.953 0.032 0.110 0.047 
10f 0.954 0.932 0.943 0.046 0.068 0.057 
15f 0.934 0.939 0.949 0.066 0.061 0.051 
20f 0.932 0.937 0.911 0.068 0.063 0.089 
 
Table 10 shows the AUC (Area Under the ROC Curve) 
recorded for the three models at the various feature settings. 
An ROC curve plots the TPR against FPR for every possible 
detection cut-off. The total area under the ROC curve (AUC) 
indicates the classifier’s predictive power. An AUC value of 1 
implies perfect classification (i.e. 100% TPR and 0% FPR). 
Therefore, as mentioned earlier, an AUC value closer to 1 
denotes better classifier predictive power. It can be observed 
from Table 9 that with the highest AUC of 0.97731, the M-
based model with 15f setting is deemed the most predictive of 
all. Generally, lower AUC values were obtained by the P-
based model compared to the C- and M-based models. 
Table 10. Area Under ROC curve and precision for all 
models. 
  AUC-P AUC-C AUC-M Pre-P Pre-C Pre-M 
5fL 0.67103 0.61709 0.89217 0.825 0.860 0.894 
5fT 0.91377 0.94437 0.93859 0.960 0.880 0.940 
10f 0.93722 0.97428 0.96264 0.948 0.931 0.938 
15f 0.94259 0.97232 0.97731 0.927 0.937 0.950 
20f 0.94087 0.97223 0.97151 0.922 0.935 0.945 
 
Precision results are also given for the three models in 
Table 10.  Precision, as expressed in equation (11), denotes the 
precision of the model(s) when classifying samples as 
suspicious.  It is therefore influenced by the number of false 
positives; a model with zero false positives will record 100% 
precision. From Table 9, it can be observed that the M-based 
model with 15f setting had precision of 0.950. Only 5fT with 
P-based model had a higher precision value. This, as 
mentioned earlier, can be attributed to classifier bias arising 
from ‘sparse vectors’ (due to the relatively small number of 
feature vectors) which enables relatively low false positive 
rate for the P-based model at 5fT setting as depicted in Figure 
7. 
The results suggest that mixed- based and code property-
based models are a better choice than the permissions-only 
model. With overall accuracy values reaching approximately 
0.9, 0.92, and 0.93 for the permission-based, code property-
based, and mixed attributes models respectively, the three 
models recorded good performance. However, our 
comparative analyses with several metrics showed that mixed-
based approach is the most promising of the three in the 
context of our problem, with potential for improvement. Note 
that the detection rates obtainable from all three models 
significantly exceed the best case of 79.6% with signature-
based scanning recorded for the same malware sample set 
utilized in our experiments as reported in [3].  
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Figure 8: The ROC curve for the 15f M-based model 
(AUC=0.97731) 
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Another noteworthy aspect of our study is the excellent 
AUC performance of the best case model (i.e. 0.97731, from 
the 15f M-based model). The ROC plot is shown in Figure 8 
below. The implication of a high AUC is that better detection 
rate performance can be obtained by trade-off with higher 
false positive rates which may be tolerable in some 
implementation scenarios. For instance, as part of an overall 
anti-malware system with further analysis stages, or in 
filtering apps to prioritize samples for further manual scrutiny, 
or as an input stage to drive decisions such as length and depth 
of further analysis processes. Figure 8 depicts the model’s 
ability to operate at 94.8% detection rate with 10% FPR. 
The results of this paper compare favourably with related 
works in the literature, thus highlighting the significance of 
our approach. Previous related work which employed static 
analysis used different sample sizes than ours, so a direct 
comparison is not straightforward (although some of the 
malware samples across these studies overlap). For instance, 
[29] employed 238 malware samples while [22], [34] and [35] 
based their experiments on 249, 378 and 121 malware samples 
respectively. Our study, on the other hand, utilized 1000 
malware samples but nevertheless performed competitively 
and for most performance metrics outperformed the previous 
models. For instance, our 15f M-based model had a detection 
rate of 0.91 compared to 0.873 in [29] and was close enough 
to the best case of 0.92 in [22] despite using a much larger 
sample set. On the other hand the AUC of our model is 
significantly higher (0.97731) compared to 0.92 best case 
obtained in [22], which accounts for their false positive rate of 
0.21 being much higher than the false positive rate of  0.051 
obtained with our 15f M-based model. In Figure 9 we 
compare AUC results from this paper with previous work, 
highlighting the excellent predictive power of our (M-based 
model) approach. The AUC from our 15f C-based model was 
0.972, also higher than previously published results. Our 15f 
P-based model, which was the best case for the permissions 
only scenario, also performed very well with an AUC of 
0.9426.  
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Figure 9: AUC results comparison with related work. 
7.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigated three data mining based 
methods for detecting unknown Android malware. These 
utilized Bayesian classification models built from mining data 
generated by automated reverse engineering of the Android 
application packages using a Java implemented custom 
package analyzer. The three models investigated were built 
from static analysis of (a) Standard Android permissions in the 
Manifest files (b) Code properties indicative of potential 
malicious payload (c) both standard permissions and code 
properties. The models were built by extracting these 
properties from a set of 1000 samples of 49 Android malware 
families together with another 1000 benign applications across 
a wide variety of categories. 
Extensive experiments were undertaken to study the 
performance of the models in terms of error rate, accuracy, 
true negative rate, true positive rate, false positive rate, false 
negative rate, precision and also area under ROC curve. The 
results suggest that mixed- based and code property-based 
models are a better choice than the permissions-only model. 
With overall accuracy values reaching approximately 0.9, 
0.92, and 0.93 for the permission-based, code property-based, 
and mixed attributes models respectively, the three models 
recorded good performance. However, our comparative 
analyses with several metrics showed that mixed-based 
approach is the most promising of the three in the context of 
our problem. With this method, an excellent predictive power 
evidenced by AUC result of about 0.977 is achievable, 
exceeding previous similar approaches in the published 
literature.  
Our results not only demonstrate practically the potential 
of data mining for unknown Android malware detection, but 
also the effectiveness of the Bayesian classification models for 
tackling this problem. Thus, the models provide a 
complementary approach to signature-based scanning or 
dynamic analysis, and fast filtering capabilities for large scale 
analyses to uncover unknown malware. The malware samples 
used in our experiments were from the largest publicly 
available collection at the time of writing. Hence, future work 
would investigate the models’ performance with larger sample 
sets as more malware samples are discovered in the wild.  
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